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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
    
This dissertation is structured as an evaluation on the question whether the apparent failure of 
South African copyright law to adequately safeguard the rights of owners of those copyrights 
means that the current copyright legislative framework falls short of the objectives of s25 of 
the Constitution1 (the right to property) and thus requires to be developed in order protect the 
rights of copyright owners. If so, how must the development take place in a way that also 
promotes the copyright user’s right to freedom of expression in s16 of the Constitution?2 In 
essence, the topic for discussion invariably leads to an assessment of South Africa’s 
copyright legislative framework in developing copyrights. 
 
The discussion will compare the South African position on copyrights with copyright 
protection in the United States of America. This dissertation will discuss whether South 
Africa’s copyright law provides adequate protection for owners’ copyrights against 
infringement by users. Any development of copyright law would need to be balanced against 
the copyright user’s right to freedom of expression as will be articulated below.3 The 
discussion is timely as South Africa is still engaged in a national copyright policy 
formulation.4  
 
The questions above cannot be answered without an analysis of:  
1. The current South African copyright legislative framework;  
2. The international copyright laws, conventions and agreements that protect copyright; 
3. The copyright legislative framework in the United States of America; and 
4. The balance between copyright and the right to freedom of expression.  
 
The combination of the aforementioned analysis is used to lay a foundation for an 
evaluation, the object of which is to discuss the development or reform of copyrights in South 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter ‘the Constitution’).  
2 In terms of s16 (1) of the Constitution everyone has the right to freedom of expression 
3 M Conroy ‘Access to works protected by copyright: Right or privilege?’ 2006 SA Merc LJ 413.  
4 This research reflects the copyright legislative status quo as at November 2018.  
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Africa in a way that considers both the owner’s and user’s interest.5 The issue is of practical 
significance because copyright protection is essential for persons who create eligible original 
works. This protection serves a broader societal interest by providing exclusive rights 
incentives for authors to produce economically valuable original works and contribute to the 
improvement of intellectual property resources.6 It is also equally important that copyright 
protection promotes accessibility to information and does not infringe on the user’s freedom 
to receive or impart information; freedom of artistic creativity; academic freedom and 
freedom of scientific research; or the freedom of the press and other media.7    
 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
a) Importance of copyright protection  
Section 25 (1) of the Constitution states that no one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of a law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Subsection (4) (b) states that property is not limited to land.  Although the primary 
focus of the section is land, the inclusion of section 25 (4) (b) appears to be a catch-all sub-
section to include property in general.8 When the Constitutional Court had to deal with the 
question of whether the right to intellectual property was a fundamental right, the court in the 
First Certification case9 held that the right to hold intellectual property was not universally 
accepted as a fundamental right and therefore did not require to be recognised in the Bill of 
Rights.10 Whether the court’s decision was justifiable has been a topic of debate.11  
The court justified its decision by explaining that intellectual property is included 
under the catch-all term of ‘property’ covered in section 25 (4) (b) of the Constitution, 
finding that it is therefore not necessary to deal with it separately in the Bill of Rights. The 
                                                          
5 ‘Report on the South African Open Copyright Review’ at 7, available at   
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Section 16 of the Constitution.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
10 M du Bois ‘Intellectual property as a Constitutional Property Right: The South African approach’ 2012 SA 
Merc LJ 178. 
11 Ibid.  
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court in its judgment decided that it was not a universally accepted norm to include a specific 
intellectual property right in a separate clause in the Constitution.12  
The failure of the Constitution to explicitly mention the right to intellectual property 
does not therefore mean that the right is excluded. Du Bois makes the example that many 
other property rights recognised in private law are not mentioned in the Constitution and yet 
the rights are still recognised and protected under the property clause such as rights to 
tangible movables.13 It is important to recognise from the outset that copyright protects an 
author’s right to own their intellectual property. The right entitles them to exclusive rights 
which allow them to use their works to the exclusion of others. This principle is important for 
the purposes of discussing whether South African copyright law adequately protects authors’ 
rights.   
 
b) Balancing copyright protection with the freedom of expression 
It is equally important from the outset to examine the relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression. This is because it is important to achieve a balance between the tenets 
of copyright law and the Bill of Rights. The fundamental human rights in the Constitution 
include the right to freedom of expression which is considered to have a bearing on 
copyrights. 
In terms of s16 (1) of the Constitution everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes: 
(a)  Freedom of the press and other media; 
(b)  Freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;  
(c)  Freedom of artistic creativity; and  
(d)  Academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
  
Copyright law is established and developed in the public interest. The accepted 
obligation on copyright law arising out of the right to freedom of expression is that the public 
should have access to copyright works in order to develop. What this has essentially led to is 
                                                          
12 Du Bois op cit note 10.  
13 Ibid at 179.  
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the development of certain exceptions which allow people to make use of copyright materials 
without permission from the copyright owner. 
It is clear that copyright protection must be balanced against the equally important 
right to freedom of expression. In Laugh it Off Promotions CC v The South African Breweries 
International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as 
Amicus Curiae)14 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Laugh it Off case’) the Constitutional Court 
held that the right to freedom of expression and intellectual property rights enjoyed equal 
status under the Constitution.15 Although the subject matter of the case dealt with trade marks 
it is important for our discussion to examine this case in dealing with the relationship 
between copyrights and freedom of expression.   
In the High Court Sabmarks sought and obtained an interdict against Laugh It Off 
Promotions CC (Laugh It Off) in terms of s34 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act16, the anti-
dilution clause, which prohibits the use of a well-known trade mark where its use would be 
detrimental to or take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the mark.17 
The trade mark in question was held by Sabmark International which is licensed to South 
African Breweries (SAB) for use on their beer bottles. The trade mark states: ‘America’s 
lusty, lively beer Carling Black Label Beer Brewed in South Africa’. It had come to 
Sabmark’s attention that Laugh It Off was producing T-shirts for sale that publicly criticised 
the trade mark by stating: ‘Africa’s lusty, lively exploitation since 1652 White Black Labour 
Guilt No regard given worldwide’.18  
Laugh It Off appealed the High Court’s interdict to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The 
SCA found in favour of SAB and held that the mark used on the T-shirts by Laugh It Off 
conveyed a message that Sabmark was guilty of exploiting black labour and for racial 
discrimination. The SCA found that use of the mark was likely to take unfair advantage or 
cause detriment to Sabmark’s trade mark. The SCA held that Laugh It Off essentially fed off 
the trade mark’s reputation in order to sell T-shirts. The SCA held further that there were 
                                                          
14 Laugh it Off Promotions CC v The South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark 
International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). 
15 O H Dean ‘Intellectual Property and the Constitution’, available at 
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/2015/07/14/intellectual-property-and-the-constitution/, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
16 Act 194 of 1993. 
17 Du Bois op cit note 10 at 189.  
18 Laugh It Off supra note 14 para 16. 
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other ways that Laugh It Off could have expressed itself without harming the trade mark. The 
SCA upheld the interdict.19  
Laugh It Off applied for leave to appeal the SCA decision. Its argument was that the 
mark on the T-shirt they produced criticises the way SAB markets its beer by targeting black 
workers, or critiques the exploitation of blacks by whites. It relied on the right to freedom of 
expression and contended that the right protects both of their expressions, and therefore that 
an interpretation of s34 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act does not allow Sabmark to obtain an 
interdict, except where it is shown that economic harm would likely occur.20 
Sabmark opposed the application on the basis that the right to freedom of expression 
does not protect Laugh It Off’s use of the ‘Carling Black Label’ mark and that it is not 
necessary for it to present evidence to show the likelihood of economic harm to obtain an 
interdict in terms of s34 (1) (c) for use of the mark by Laugh It Off.21 The Constitutional 
Court admitted the Freedom of Expression Institute (hereafter referred to as ‘the FXI’), which 
made common cause with Laugh It Off, as amicus curiae. The FXI’s argument was that the 
protection of trade marks must be interpreted in light of the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression and allow parody by way of ‘fair use’ that does not violate anti-dilution 
provisions.22  
In the decision Moseneke J found that Sabmark failed to prove that Laugh It Off had 
infringed their trademark right in s34 (1) (c) because ‘likelihood of taking advantage of, or 
being detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the marks’ had not been 
established.23 More importantly Moseneke found that the rights of a person to express 
themselves cannot be lightly limited. The right to freedom of expression can be limited where 
the harm to the trade mark holder is material which is an internal limitation of s34 (1) (c). In 
addition to the harm being material Moseneke further found that the interpretation of the 
section has to conform to the Constitution and the society envisioned in it which requires one 
relying on the protection of the section or Act to show a real likelihood or probability of 
                                                          
19 Laugh It Off supra note 14 para 25.  
20 Ibid para 51. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid para 6.  
23 Ibid para 73.  
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harm. The harm must be economic in nature because the aim of the section is to protect the 
trade mark’s selling power rather than its dignity.24  
The court found that the Constitution does not exclude or afford special protection to 
any expression but the ones falling under s 16 (1).25 Freedom of expression must be balanced 
against other rights, of which the right to property (including intellectual property) is one. 
Placing the onus on the trade mark holder to present evidence to prove the likelihood of 
substantial economic harm is an appropriate balance of these rights.26 Laugh It Off was not 
selling beer in competition with Sabmark but was instead involved in selling an abstract 
brand criticism and the T-shirts were merely a medium of doing so.27 The expressive conduct 
was thus acceptable in terms of the Constitution. It was not an infringement of the trade mark 
because SAB had failed to prove likelihood of economic harm. The court therefore granted 
leave to appeal and set aside the decision of the SCA.28         
 
c) Basis for arguments for copyright reform and development  
There are two diverging views. The one side argues in favour of limiting the ‘restrictive 
copyright laws’ in South Africa. Copyrights can present technical difficulties to those 
engaged in a development analysis of the law and its impacts. They argue that strengthening 
the position of copyright owners would invariably lead to near-impermeable monopolies and 
thereby stifle accessibility to important works which would help develop society. Essentially, 
they argue that in a developing country like South Africa this would have an adverse impact 
by preventing users from accessing important educational material.29  
The diverging view of the opposing side argues that the important goal of copyrights 
is to effectively encourage persons to author original works by providing a reward and 
stimulus to authors through affording them exclusive rights over their work.30 For this reason 
                                                          
24 Ibid para 102. 
25 ‘Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark 
International CCT 42/04 at 2’, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2005/7.html accessed on 18 
July 2018. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Nomvuyo Siphepho Copyright and Developing Countries (unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-
Natal, 2014) 7. 
30 Ibid. 
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they argue further that strengthening the position of copyright owners is for the benefit of the 
economy which positively impacts society.  
d) International protection of copyright  
The more advanced regions of the world began to embrace the importance of protecting 
copyrights in the 1700s. As far back as 1709 the first copyright law, formally known as the 
Statute of Anne, was enacted in England. This Act introduced the exclusive right of an author 
over a book for a period of twenty years for work already published, and fourteen years for 
work published subsequently.  Thereafter enactments of legislation protecting intellectual 
property rights began to spread across the European Union region and the United States of 
America. The United States Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. During this period 
intellectual property legislation was uncoordinated at an international level until the 19th 
century.31  
International coordination of copyright protection began formally when the Berne 
Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (hereafter referred to as ‘The Berne 
Convention’) was introduced in 1886 to provide mutual recognition of copyrights between 
countries.32  The Berne Convention is the oldest and one of the most important multilateral 
copyright treaties. It states that copyright is an automatic right, that the author or creator 
obtains as soon as the work created has been fixed, for example that the work has been 
recorded or written down.33 The convention makes further provision for international 
reciprocation for copyright works, meaning that when an original work is created in one 
country it will be automatically protected by copyright in any other country that is also 
signatory. South Africa became a member of the Berne Convention in 1928 and the United 
States of America adopted the treaty in 1988.34    
An international organisation for intellectual property rights known as the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) was established with the introduction of ‘the 
Convention Establishing the WIPO’ in 1967.35 WIPO is a specialised agency of the United 
Nations (UN) that promotes intellectual property protection and ensures administrative 
                                                          
31 Intellectual Property Rights Office ‘A Brief History of Copyright’ available at 
http://www.iprightsoffice.org/copyright_history/ , accessed on 15 September 2018. 
32 Peter Ramsden A Guide to Intellectual Property Law (2011) 11.   
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid at 12.  
35 Ibid.  
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cooperation amongst intellectual property unions established by treaties which WIPO 
administers. The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual property rights (TRIPS) was signed in 1995. The WTO is an international 
organisation with the mandate of dealing with international rules of trade.36 A part of the 
TRIPS agreement is based on the Berne Convention. South Africa is bound by the TRIPS 
agreement and has been adhering to it since 1994.37  
The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT) of 1996 were signed in Geneva, Switzerland with the intention to update and 
supplement the existing international treaties on copyrights (WCT) and neighbouring rights 
(WPPT). This was done in order to give an adequate response on the level of international 
copyright legislation to the challenges raised for copyright by digitising and the internet, 
particularly with regard to the dissemination of copyright protected material.38 South Africa 
is signatory to all of the above mentioned international treaties, however South Africa may 
only accede to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT) when the Copyright Act has been redrafted to address digital technology and 
such related issues.39   
 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION  
Chapter one comprises a broad outline of the purpose of the present study.  The topics that 
follow thereafter provide a background to the study. Among these topics is the status of 
intellectual property as a constitutional right and an explanation of freedom of expression in 
the context of copyrights.  The chapter moves on to discuss the basis for arguments for 
copyright reform and development.  The topic further looks at international protection of 
copyrights. The chapter then concludes with the structure of the dissertation.  
The second chapter comprises an examination of the copyright legislative framework 
and jurisprudence. It particularly deals with the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 on the following 
topics: categories of works eligible for copyright, duration of copyright, identifying the 
author, requirement for works to be eligible for copyright, infringement of copyright, and 
                                                          
36 Ramsden op cit note 32.  
37 Ibid at 13.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
9 
 
remedies for copyright infringement, general copyright exceptions and limitations with 
emphasis on the doctrine of ‘fair dealing’. The chapter then moves on to discuss the 
Copyright Regulations 1978, the Intellectual Property Amendment Act 28 of 2013, and the 
Copyright Amendment Bill [B13B-2017]. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression. 
The third chapter examines the current US copyright legislative framework. It 
particularly deals with the US Copyright Act 1976 by examining the following topics: 
categories of works eligible for copyright, duration of copyright, identifying the author, 
requirement for works to be eligible for copyright, registration of copyright, infringement of 
copyright, remedies for copyright infringement, general copyright exceptions and limitations 
with emphasis on the doctrine of ‘fair use’. The chapter will also include a discussion on the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression under the United States of 
America’s law. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998. 
The final chapter concludes the discussion and sets out recommendations for the 
reform of South African law. These recommendations are then consolidated and weighed 
with the view to conclude on how South Africa’s copyright laws can adequately protect 
owner’s copyrights and how to improve the balance of copyright protection and freedom of 
expression.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 THE SOUTH AFRICAN COPYRIGHT LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The South African market is flooded with unauthorized use of copyrighted works. 
Contraventions of the rights of copyright owners have almost become normal in our society. 
For example, if you are walking in the Pietermaritzburg/Durban CBD today you will find a 
number of vendors selling unlawfully copied South African/International movies, series, 
music albums, and books. With the advent of the internet, copyrights have been subject to 
infringement on an even larger scale. Contraventions of copyright are rampant in our society, 
and they occur in different ways which will be discussed below. Normalizing such 
contraventions works to the detriment of creativity. 
These contraventions are damaging to the copyright owner’s right to the material 
which they have produced using their own skill and labour. It also has a very negative effect 
on the economic success of their goods or products. If, for example, well-known authors, 
artists, or companies can have their copyrights so easily infringed it poses a serious threat to 
the social and economic viability of being an author in South Africa.40 In the context of high 
rates of copyright infringements in our society, the crucial question arises whether copyright 
law currently serves its purpose to adequately protect the rights of copyright owners.  
2. THE COPYRIGHT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
a) The Copyright Act 
 
i. Categories of works eligible for copyright  
 
The South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is designed to 
protect an author against exploitation of their copyrights. The Act is largely based on British 
copyright legislation.41 In terms of the Act the following works, if they are original, are 
eligible for copyright: literary works, musical works, artistic works, sound recordings, 
                                                          
40 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 5.   
41 Siphepho op cit note 29 at 8.  
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cinematograph films, sound and television broadcasts, programme-carrying signals, 
published editions, and computer programs.42 Each category of these works contains a variety 
of works. Literary works include novels, textbooks, dictionaries, plays, letters, poetic works, 
television and film scripts, song lyrics, reports, speeches, sermons and lectures.43 Musical 
works include music only and the actual words of a song may be copyrighted separately as a 
literary work as well as the recording of the song.44 Artistic works include paintings, 
sculptures, drawings, photographs, engravings, pottery, architecture works and artisanal 
works.45 
Sound recordings which are neither music nor lyric are listed separately. 
Cinematography films include celluloid films as well as any videotapes, DVD’s, laser discs 
and microchips that may have film recorded on them.46 Sound and television, broadcasts 
defined as the actual broadcast, made up of electromagnetic waves, not the content of the 
broadcast, is subject to copyright.47 The content of the broadcast, such as music, could be 
subject to copyright under another category such as sound recordings.48   
ii. Duration of a copyright 
 
A copyright subsists in a work for a period of 50 years from the end of the year that the 
author died for literary, musical, and artistic works, and 50 years from the date that the work 
was published, performed or broadcasted for other works. Where a literary, musical or artistic 
work was first published, performed, broadcasted or offered for sale after the death of the 
author, then the copyright subsists for 50 years from that later date.49 The Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) provides for a minimum duration of 
protection. The Berne Convention generally grants protection for a term of 50 years after the 
work was made. The Berne Convention requires that copyright in photographs subsist for 
                                                          
42 Report on the South African’ 2008 Open Copyright Review at 8, available at 
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
43 Section 1 of the Copyright Act.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Section 1 and 2 of the Copyright Act.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 29. 
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only 25 years and that copyright for works made public after the author’s death should subsist 
for 50 years after the author’s death.50 
iii. Identifying the author 
The Copyright Act provides guidelines for identifying a person who qualifies as the author of 
a copyright. For literary works, musical works, and artistic works the author is the person 
who first creates the work.51 For photographs, the author is the person who is responsible for 
the composition of the photograph.52 The first broadcaster is the copyright owner for a 
broadcast and the publisher is the copyright holder for a published edition.53 For sound 
recordings, the author is the person who made arrangements for the making of the film or 
recording. The person who emits the signal to a satellite is the copyright owner of a 
programme-carrying signal.54 
The person who exercised control over the making of the programme is considered to 
be the author of the computer programme. There are however exceptions in the Act to these 
definitions of the author.55 If a person commissions a photograph, painting, film, sound 
recording or drawing of a painting, then the person who commissioned the work is entitled to 
the authorship of that work.56 If a literary work is created by an author who is employed by a 
magazine, newspaper, or a publication of a similar kind, the authorship vests in the publisher. 
Works that are created in the course of an author’s employment ultimately belong to the 
employer.57 
The exclusive right conferred upon the author of a copyright gives that author the 
entitlement to prohibit or allow other persons to make a reproduction of the work, to 
distribute the work, and to adapt the intellectual creation in exchange for money or some 
other benefit.58 The benefit behind this protection is to give the creator the right to exclude 
others from using their work and the principle behind this is that other persons should not be 
                                                          
50 Report on the South African’ 2008 Open Copyright Review at 5, available at  
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
51 Section 1 of the Copyright Act.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Report on the South African’ 2008 Open Copyright Review at 10, available at 
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Conroy op cit note 3 at 413.  
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able to reap the benefits arising from what the copyright owner has created.  Section 3 of the 
Act deals with copyright by virtue of nationality, domicile or residence, and duration of 
copyright. 
 It states that copyright is automatically conferred in every work, eligible for 
copyright, of which the author or, in the case of a work of joint authorship, any one of the 
authors is at the time the work or a substantial part thereof is made, a qualified person, that is 
in the case of an individual, a person who is a South African citizen or is domiciled or 
resident in the Republic; or in the case of a juristic person, a body incorporated under the 
laws of the Republic: provided that a work of architecture erected in the Republic or any 
other artistic work incorporated in a building or any other permanent structure in the 
Republic, shall be eligible for copyright, whether or not the author was a qualified person.59  
Essentially this means that where the author or one of the joint authors are domiciled, citizen, 
or resident in South Africa the copyright automatically subsists in the work they have 
authored.60   
 In terms of s4, which deals with copyright by reference to country of origin, a 
copyright is conferred on eligible works whereby the copyright was first published, or 
broadcasted, or made in South Africa or work which is omitted to a satellite from a place in 
South Africa.61    
iv. Requirement for works to be eligible for copyrights  
In terms of s2 the requirements for copyright in a work are: 
1. ‘The work must be one of the types of works that are eligible; 
2. The work must be an original (‘the originality’ requirement)62; and 
3. The work (except a broadcast or programme-carrying signal), must have been written down, recorded, 
or represented in digital data or signals or otherwise reduced to a material form. A broadcast or a 
programme-carrying signal must, in the case of a broadcast, have been broadcasted and, in the case of a 
programme carrying signal, have been transmitted by a satellite (‘Materiality’ requirement).’63 
 
                                                          
59 Section 3 (1) of the Copyright Act.  
60 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 18. 
61 Section 4 of the Copyright Act.   
62 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act.  
63 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act. 
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In terms of s2 (1) of the Copyright Act, copyrights protect any person who by his own 
skill and labour creates an original of work.64 An original work is a work that is not copied 
from another work. It requires that the work must have originated from the author.65 An 
objective test is applied in assessing whether a work is indeed an original. Novelty in an 
authored work is not a requirement for originality. However, the work must emanate from the 
author and not be copied from another work. A degree of the authors own labour and skill 
must be shown.66  
In terms of the Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence and Others67 the 
amount of labour, skill or judgment which is required is a question of fact and degree in every 
case. A work that is eligible for copyright may be subject to improvement or refinement by 
another author. Even if the improvement or refinement involved an infringement of the 
copyright in the original work, as long as the actual improvement or refinement of the 
original work is the subsequent author’s original and substantial work it will be eligible for 
copyright.68 Where there are features of a previously authored work within a subsequent work 
this does not necessarily mean that the work is an infringement of a copyright and therefore 
does not qualify for copyright protection.69  
A copyright can exist in a work even where all the features of the work existed before 
its creation so long as the requisite degree of skill and labour went into its creation. In 
Marwick Wholesalers v Hallmark Hemdon70 the court found that originality as a requirement 
for the vesting of a copyright does not require that the work be unique or inventive. Instead 
what is required is that the work must be a product of the author’s own labour and skill and 
not a copy of another work.       
In terms of the Copyright Act a copyright does not subsist in the idea, instead a 
copyright subsists in the work reduced to a material form (see s2(2) and 2(2A)). This means 
that whilst an idea of a work exists in a person’s mind there can be no copyright in it. For 
example, an idea of a literary work can only be subject to copyright once it has been written 
                                                          
64 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act.  
65 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 25.  
66 C Ncube Equitable Intellectual Property Protection of Computer Programmes in South Africa: Some 
Proposals for Reform (unpublished thesis, University of Cape Town ) 439. 
67 Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence and Others 2006 (4) SA 458.  
68 Section 2(3) of the Copyright Act   
69 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 27.  
70 Marwick Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v Hallmark Hemdon (Pty) Ltd 1999 JOC 707.  
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down. Publication of the work is not a requirement of ‘material form’.71  Ncube states that 
‘the requirement of material form in s 2(2) has been viewed as flowing from the ‘idea-
expression dichotomy’ which seeks to limit copyright protection to the expression and not a 
mere idea or functionality of works.72 This position is legislated in the United States of 
America.73  
It has also been adopted in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright 
Treaty.74 The idea-expression dichotomy is criticized as being both simplistic and inadequate 
because a situation may arise where it is not possible to separate an idea from an 
expression.75 This is at times the case when dealing with computer programmes. The 
Copyright Act does not provide for the use of the idea-expression dichotomy, however courts 
have acknowledged it.76 The court in Sure Travel Ltd v Excel Travel (Pty) Ltd77 found that it 
is the mode of expression that is protected in a literary work and not any functional features.78 
 
v. The Infringement of copyrights    
As stated above copyrights subsist in original works automatically. In other words, an author 
does not need to register their copyright. Once the work has been created and an automatic 
copyright subsists, s23 (1) of the Act provides that: 
  ‘a copyright shall be infringed by any person, not being the owner of a copyright, who does or causes 
any other person to do, in the Republic, any act which the owner has the exclusive rights to do or to authorise, 
such as: 
i. Reproduce the work if the work is a literary work, musical work, artistic work, or cinematograph films; 
ii. Adapt the work if the work is a literary work, including, in the case of a non-dramatic work, a version 
of the work in which it is converted into a dramatic work; 
iii. Publish the work if it has not yet been published; 
iv. Perform the work in public;  
v. Broadcast the work; or 
                                                          
71 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 27.  
72 Ncube op cit note 66 at 440.  
73 Section 102 (b) of the US Copyright Act 1976 17 USC. 
74 Ncube op cit note 66 at 440.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.  
77Sure Travel Ltd v Excel Travel (Pty) Ltd 2004 BIP 275 (W). 
78 Ncube op cit note 66 at 440. 
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vi. Cause the work to be transmitted in a diffusion service.’79 
 
Although different terms may be used to refer to these infringing acts with regard to a 
particular category of work, the definition of infringing acts will amount to the acts referred 
to above. These infringing actions ultimately refer to the unlawful copying, modification, 
using and exploiting of copyright works and is the particular focus of this discussion.80 
Section 23 (2) states that: 
 ‘a copyright shall be infringed by any person who, without the licence of the copyright owner, at a time when 
copyright subsist does the following: 
1. imports an article into the Republic for a purpose other than for his private and domestic use: 
2. sells, lets, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire in the Republic any article; 
3. distributes in the Republic any article for the purposes of trade, or for any other purpose, to such an 
extent that the owner of the copyright in question is prejudicially affected; or 
4. acquires an article relating to a computer program in the Republic, if to his knowledge the making of 
that article constituted an infringement of that copyright or would have constituted such an 
infringement if the article had been made in the Republic.’81 
 
Section 23(3) provides that the copyright in a literary or musical work shall be 
infringed by any person who permits a place of public entertainment to be used for a 
performance in public of the work, where the performance constitutes an infringement of the 
copyright in the work: Provided that this subsection shall not apply in a case where the person 
permitting the place of public entertainment to be so used was not aware and had no 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the performance would be an infringement of the 
copyright.82 
The reference to ‘any act’ in subsection 23 (1) refers to an adaptation, broadcast, 
copying, performing, rebroadcasting, or reproduction or a work. These acts are all defined in 
section 1 of the Act. Section 1(2A) of the Act provides that it is sufficient to show copyright 
infringement if a ‘substantial part’ of an owner’s copyright work has been reproduced, 
copied, published, performed or broadcast.83 Section 1(2A) of the Act and s 16 of the United 
                                                          
79 ‘Report on the South African Open Copyright Review’ at 11, available at  
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Section 23(1) of the Copyright Act. 
82 Section 23 of the Copyright Act.  
83 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 54.   
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Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (The UK Copyright Act) are almost 
identical in wording. The use of the term ‘substantial part’ in legislation first appeared in the 
1911 UK Copyright Act and early English jurisprudence which has set the yardstick for the 
copyright infringement test.84      
The test to determine whether a ‘substantial part’ of a work has been copied requires a 
qualitative enquiry as to whether the substance of that particular work has been copied. In 
applying the copyright infringement test, the court looks at the quality of what was taken in 
an infringing work more than at the quantity of what was taken.85 In Ladbroke (Football) Ltd 
v William Hill (Football)86 Ltd the court found that the question whether a person has copied 
a substantial part depends much more on the quality than the quantity of what he has taken. 
The wording of section 1(2A) supports the orientation towards a qualitative assessment. Use 
of the word ‘any’ allows the court to consider any part taken, big or small.87 The part taken 
must have substance in content that contributes to the originality of the work. The qualitative 
assessment requires a look at the nature, character, and original features of a work which give 
it a distinctive or unique character.88   
The emphasis on a qualitative approach does not however mean that a quantitative 
assessment of how much of the work was taken is irrelevant. Both assessments are 
considered in a court’s decision however the qualitative assessment has more weight. The 
quantitative assessment is a more arithmetic consideration. The rationale in the courts 
favouring the qualitative assessment is that a small part of an original work may be taken 
which may embody the characteristic which makes the work identifiable and gives it 
character. For example, in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd89 
the court found that the conduct amounted to a reproduction of a substantial part where only 
63 lines of source code, out of multiple thousands, were copied. The court found that the 63 
lines copied were considered to be the ingredient of the programme.90 The qualitative 
                                                          
84 A Rogowski ‘Can a song be copied with impunity? — A legal perspective on copyright infringement cases in 
respect of musical works’ 2017 Stell LR 217. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) 1964 1 All ER 465 (HL). 
87 Rogowski op cit note 84 at 217.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 JOL 17063 (SCA) para 45. 
90 Ibid.  
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assessment gives rise to the question of what constitutes an important characteristic, or 
original part of a work.91  
In Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd & another v Erasmus92  it was held that for a 
copyright infringement to have occurred it must be shown that: 
1. ‘There is sufficient objective similarity between the alleged infringing work and the original work, or a 
‘substantial part’ thereof, for the former to be described as a reproduction or copy of the latter; and 
2. The original work was the source from which the alleged infringing work was derived. There must be a 
direct or indirect causal connection between the original work and the alleged infringing work. The 
enquiry must be whether the defendant copied the plaintiffs’ work, or is it an independent work’.93    
 
If either of these tests is not met, then no copying of a substantial part of the protected 
work has taken place and there will been no infringement. Copyright infringement does not 
occur where a work that is very similar to or even identical to another work was created but 
the creator produced the second work independently and without reference to the other 
work.94 The subject of ‘substantial part’ should be considered with caution where the subject 
of the work is common. For example, research conducted into the Copyright Act would be 
the subject of many works and would be common property to all who write on it. Regardless 
of the category of work protected by copyright, the infringement test remains the same.95 
Indirect infringement of a work which occurs by reproducing a reproduction of an 
original work has also been found to be an infringement of copyright. Section 1(1) of the Act 
includes a definition of a reproduction in a work, as the’ reproduction of the reproduction’. 
Indirect infringement takes place when certain acts are done without the authority of the 
copyright owner in connection with direct infringements of a copyright. There are two forms 
of indirect infringement of copyright: 
1. Unauthorised dealing with infringing copies of a work; and 
                                                          
91 Ibid.  
92 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd & another v Erasmus 1989 (1) SA 276 (A).  
93 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 58.   
94 H Blignaut ‘Copyright litigation in South Africa: Overview’ at 8, available at  
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-
0121995?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1 , accessed 
on 22 October 2018. 
95 Ibid.  
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2. Permitting an infringing public performance of a work to take place.96 
 
vi. Remedies for copyright infringements  
A copyright can only be enforced in the South African High Courts. There are no specialised 
copyright courts. This means that the presiding officer’s expertise on copyrights may differ 
on a case-by-case basis.97 Copyright litigation occurs in accordance with civil procedure. The 
copyright owner who seeks relief for infringement is known as the plaintiff or claimant and 
the alleged infringing person is referred to as the defendant.98 In the case of joint ownership 
of a copyright a co-author may not sue for damages resulting from infringement of the 
copyright without joining the other co-author(s) or making a case for entitlement to sue alone 
(see Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 1 (SCA).99    
Section 24 (1) of the Copyright Act states that an infringement of a copyright is 
actionable. The copyright owner is entitled to any action for such infringement by way of 
relief in damages, interdict, delivery of infringing copies or plates used or intended to be used 
for infringing copies or otherwise shall be available to the plaintiff as is available in any 
corresponding proceedings in respect of infringements of other proprietary rights.  
The following remedies are available for copyright infringement in terms of the Act - 
I. An Interdict 
In the Performing Right Society Ltd v Berman & another case100 it was held that an interdict 
is granted as a remedy where: 
i. ‘The plaintiff’s copyright and the breach of it is clearly established; 
ii. The defendant claims no right to do what he has done without permission or a 
license from the plaintiff and the payment of a royalty; 
iii. The defendant has not given an undertaking to not repeat the infringement; 
and  
iv.  Provided that the circumstances are not such that there is no likelihood of a 
future infringement occurring’101. 
                                                          
96 Ramsden op cit 32 at 59.  
97 Blignaut op cit note 94 at 2.   
98 Ibid.  
99 Ramsden op cit 32 at 69 
100Performing Right Society Ltd v Berman & another 1966 (2) SA 355 (R). 
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Ramsden states that in determining whether a court should grant an interdict pending 
the outcome of a court action, the court must consider ‘balance of fairness’.102 The court must 
strike a balance between the prospects of the copyright owner being successful in the main 
action and, as per the case of Harnischfeger Corporation & another v Appleton & another103 
where the court considered the- 
i. ‘Prospects of each party suffering harm as a result of the courts interference or not granting 
the interim relief; 
ii. The seriousness and irreparability of the harm; 
iii. The difficulties of proving the extent of any harm; and  
iv. The risk of not recovering the amount of damages caused by the harm’.104 
 
Where it is not possible to guarantee that the defendant will not commit the infringing 
action in the future, the plaintiff should be granted an interdict (see South African Music 
Rights Organisation Ltd v Trust Butchers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 1052 (E)).105 
II. Damages  
Damages compensate the plaintiff for loss or injury. The amount of the damages must as far 
as possible be that amount of money which will put the plaintiff in the same position he 
would have been in had he not sustained the wrong that occurred as a result of the 
infringement.106 Damages may also include license fees that the defendant would have had to 
pay during the subsistence of the copyright infringement as well as the amount spent by the 
plaintiff in establishing the infringement of the copyright.107  
The quantum of damages may be difficult to determine. The Act provides a solution 
in this regard in s25 (1A) of the Copyright Act which provides for the court to award 
royalties in lieu of damages. Section 25 (1A) provides that a reasonable royalty is in lieu of 
damages and creates a substantive remedy which does not require proof of damages to 
calculate the royalty. In Performing Right Society Ltd v Butcher and Others108 once the 
plaintiff had proved its copyright ownership of musical works and that the defendant had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
101 Performing Right Society supra note 100. 
102 Ramsden op cit 32 at 66. 
103 (495/92) [1994] ZASCA 141 
104 Ramsden op cit 32 at 67.  
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid at 69.  
107 Ibid.  
108 Performing Right Society supra note 100.   
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infringed its right the amount of royalties which the plaintiff was entitled to was 2% of the 
entire takings (amount) that the infringing performance or the work had received.109  
Section 24 (3) provides for ‘additional damages’. The court in this instance has to 
consider the material facts such as: 
(a) ‘The flagrancy of the infringement; 
(b) Any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement; and 
(c) The court is satisfied that effective relief would not otherwise be available to the plaintiff’. 
 
Section 24 (3) gives the court wide discretion in awarding additional damages, 
however- 
(i) ‘The basis for additional damages must be recognised in the common law; 
(ii) The additional damages must not be awarded as a ‘fine’; and 
(iii) The quantum of damages awarded must be fair’110. 
 
Section 24 (3) empowers a court to award only damages recognised in South African 
common law e.g. damages claimable under action resulting in derogation of personality.111 
Additional damages are damages of a kind not, but for s24 (3) recoverable either as a result of 
being unprovable or no cause of the recovery exists. In awarding additional damages courts 
must consider that the money that the defendant will be made to pay must be paid towards 
providing relief for the plaintiff, the defendant may not just simply be fined.112   
vii. General copyright exceptions and limitations  
A work that is copyright protected may be subject to being reproduced or used, whether in 
part or substantially, without a person obtaining permission from the copyright owner. The 
rationale for this is that it may be in the public interest to do so. The most important general 
exception for our purposes is known as fair dealing, which is provided for by s12 (1) of the 
Copyright Act for literary and musical works. It also applies to various other works by virtue 
of a fair dealing section applicable to it. These other works are: artistic works, cinematograph 
films (s 15(4)), sound recordings (s16 (1) (b) and (c)), broadcasts (s17 (b) and (c)), published 
                                                          
109 Ramsden op cit note 32 at 70.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Priority Records (Pty) Ltd v Ban-Nab Radio and TV 1988 (2) SA 281 (D)). 
112 Ibid at 71; see also CCP Record Co (Pty) Ltd v Avalon Record Centre 1989 (1) SA 445 (C)). 
22 
 
editions (s18), computer programs (s19A). The fair dealing provision is of importance for this 
discussion because it relates to the right to freedom of expression.113  
The Act does contain a number of more specific limitations and exceptions with 
regards to the different categories of works and kinds of works in s12. The limitations and 
exceptions are complex as each work may have different exceptions which apply to it.  
The following exceptions are provided for in the Act: use in the context of judicial 
proceedings s12(2); quotations s12(3); illustrations in any publication, broadcast or sound or 
visual record for teaching (s12(4)); ephemeral reproductions by a broadcaster (s12(5)); 
reproduction in the press or broadcasting of works delivered in public for informatory 
purposes (s12(6)); Reproduction in the press or broadcasting of published articles on current 
topics (s12(7)); there is no copyright protection for official texts of a legislative, 
administrative or legal nature, or official translations of such texts, speeches of a political 
nature, speeches delivered in the course of legal proceedings, news of the day that are mere 
items of press information (s12(8)); and bona fide demonstration of radio or television 
receivers or any type of recording equipment or playback equipment (s12(12)).  
Section 12(1) of the Act states: 
‘Copyright shall not be infringed by any fair dealing with a literary or musical work – 
(a) for the purposes of research or private study by, or the personal or private use of, the person 
using the work; 
(b) for the purposes of criticism or review of that work or of another work; or 
(c)  for the purpose of reporting current events – 
i. in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; or 
ii. by means of broadcasting or in a cinematograph film; 
Provided that, in the case of paragraphs (b) and (c) (i), the source shall be mentioned, as well as the name of the 
author if it appears on the work.’114 
The copyright owner’s right will not be contravened if the source of the work is 
referenced. There is no clear definition within the Copyright Act of ‘fair dealing’ nor does it 
provide for how much of the copyright work may be reproduced without the permission of 
the copyright owner. Instead the specific wording of the provision, with regards to how much 
                                                          
113 ‘Report on the South African Open Copyright Review’ at 13, available at 
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/c.php?g=145331&p=953503, accessed on 18 July 2018. 
114 Section 12(1) of the Copyright Act. 
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of the work is permitted to be copied provides for an amount that is compatible with fair 
practice and does not exceed the extent justified by the purpose of the reproduction or use.115 
This invariably means that the copyright user who claims reproducing or using under fair 
dealing must prove that the amount of the work copied was sufficient for one of the purposes 
listed above. Therefore, in terms of the Copyright Act as it exists there are provisions which 
enable usage of copyright works through fair dealing in a way that affords access to 
educational materials as well as uses for media and reporting.116 
In Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd117 the court found that due to lack of South 
African jurisprudence on fair dealing it would suffice to consider foreign jurisprudence to 
understand how it applies with necessary caution.118  The court looked at English authority 
because of the shared history of copyright law between South Africa and England. The court 
deemed it appropriate to do so in this regard. In considering the application of fair dealing the 
court looked at the English court of appeal judgment in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd 
2001 4 All ER 666 (CA). The English Court of Appeal specifically focused on the test for fair 
dealing.119  
The test applies as follows: 
i. First, one needs to establish if the alleged fair dealing competes commercially with 
the proprietor's exploitation of the copyright work and if it can be a substitute for the 
probable purchase of authorised copies; 
ii. Secondly, has the work already been published or otherwise exposed to the public; 
and  
iii. Thirdly, consider the amount and importance of the work that has been taken.120 
 
The court in the Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd case conceded that it is nearly impossible to 
formulate a clear definition for fair dealing because fairness is not a static concept, it requires 
a value judgment to be exercised by taking into account the unique circumstances presented 
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by each situation when dealing with original work.121 The general measure of fairness of use 
is whether a fair minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright in the same 
way in relation to the specific exception.122 The factors that the court took into consideration 
in determining whether a newspaper had published a work in accordance with fair dealing 
were, but not limited to,- 
i. The nature of the medium in which the works have been published;  
ii. Whether the original work has already been published;  
iii. The time lapse between the publications of the two works;  
iv. The amount (quality and quantity) of the work that has been taken; and  
v. The extent of the acknowledgement given to the original work.123 
 
Intellectual property rights are property rights which are subject to protection by s25 
of the Constitution and the Copyright Act however copyright exceptions such as fair dealing 
are necessary to advance human rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression in s16 of 
the Constitution.124  The main goal of the doctrine of fair dealing is to encourage legitimate 
and social uses of copyrighted works which is socially beneficial provided that it meets the 
standard of fairness and requirement of intended purpose of use.125  
b)  The Copyright Regulations 
The Copyright Act mandates the Minister of Economic Affairs by virtue of the powers vested 
in him/her in terms of s39 of the Copyright Act to make regulations (subordinate 
legislation).126  Section 13 of the Copyright Act provides that in addition to reproduction 
which is permitted by the Act, reproductions are also permitted in terms of the copyright 
regulations. The permission of reproduction is on condition that the reproduction is not 
unreasonably prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the copyright owner and does not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.127 The regulations provide for circumstances 
when it is legally acceptable to make copies of copyright work. Section 12 (1) of the 
Copyright Act only permits a single copy of a reasonable portion of a work which is 
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consistent with fair dealing to be made. Copies of a whole or major portion of a work are 
generally not permissible under the fair dealing provisions of the Act and the user is not 
entitled to make copies available to others.128    
In terms of the Copyright Regulations129 reproduction is permitted where not more 
than only one copy of a reasonable portion of the work is made, having regard to the totality 
and meaning of the work. A further limitation is that reproduction is only permitted where the 
cumulative effect of the reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
work to the unreasonable prejudice of the legal interests and residency rights of the author.130 
In terms of regulation 3, subject to regulation 2, a library or archive depot or any of its 
employees acting within the scope of their employment may, after reproduction of a copy of a 
work, distribute such copy subject to certain conditions being met. The library is not 
permitted in any way to profit from the reproduction or distribution of the work.131 The 
library must stay open to the public and also be available to researchers affiliated with the 
library. A librarian may only reproduce and distribute a limited amount of an unpublished 
work.132 A librarian may reproduce a published work to replace an original copy only in the 
circumstance that the original has deteriorated or has been damaged and there is no 
availability of the work in the market at a reasonable price. A librarian can also reproduce 
and distribute a work from the library’s own collection on request by the reader or for another 
library or archive depository.133 
However the librarian is not permitted to copy more than one article in a periodical or 
more than a reasonable portion of any other copyrighted work.134 The copy is only permitted 
to be used for private study or personal use.135 On a reader's request, a librarian can reproduce 
and give a reader an entire work or a substantial portion of a work if it is unavailable in the 
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market at a reasonable price. The reproduction of a work must have a copyright warning136 
and the library has to have a copyright warning prominently displayed on its premises.137 
The copyright limitations and exceptions afforded to libraries and librarians entitle a 
librarian to make copies of copyright material on behalf of a reader for the purpose of private 
study. The regulations make no provision for both research and private study.138 Regulation 7 
deals with multiple copies for classroom use and is subject to regulation 2. It states that 
multiple copies may be made not exceeding one copy per student per course, by the teacher 
for use in the classroom or for discussion. Regulation 8, which is also subject to regulation 2 
states that a single copy may be used by or for the teacher for research, teaching or 
preparation for teaching in a class. Regulation 9 (c) provides that notwithstanding regulation 
7 and 8 the following copying may not: 
i. ‘Be used as a substitute for the purchase of books, publishers’ reprints, or periodicals; and  
ii. Be repeated in respect of the same material by the same teacher from term to term.’ 
 
This means that a teacher who only has a single copy of a particular book may not be 
permitted to copy that book for students as that would go beyond the bounds of fair use. If a 
teacher has made course material in course pack of various works for students, the teacher is 
not permitted to re-copy this on an annual basis for students.139   
c) The Copyright Amendment Bill  
The Copyright Amendment Bill [B13B-2017] is a complex document which aims to amend 
the Copyright Act. The purpose of the Bill is to modernise the outdated and inadequate 
copyright legislation and address the lack of protection of copyrights in the digital era. The 
Bill essentially aims to protect the interest of creators of works whilst widening the scope of 
fair use of copyrighted works.140  
For the purposes of this research, a greater amount of focus will be placed on the 
provisions which deal with the broadened scope of fair use, which places significant 
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obligations for users of copyrighted works and for copyright owners.141 If approved by 
Parliament, the provisions of the Bill would provide for a greater flexibility in accessing 
information in copyrighted works.142The Bill introduces fair use and purports to repeal 
section 12 (the fair dealing provision) of the Copyright Act by inserting the following 
sections into the Copyright Act.   
Section 12A (a) provides that in addition to uses specifically authorised, fair use in 
respect of a work or the performance of that work, for the following purposes, does not 
infringe copyright in that work:  
(i) ‘Research, private study or personal use, including the use of a lawfully possessed work at a 
different time or with a different device;  
(ii) criticism or review of that work or of another work;  
(iii)  reporting current events;  
(iv)  scholarship, teaching and education;  
(v) comment, illustration, parody, satire, caricature or pastiche;  
(vi)  preservation of and access to the collections of libraries, archives and museums;  
(vii) expanding access for underserved populations; and  
(viii) ensuring proper performance of public administration. 
(b) In determining whether an act done in relation to a work constitutes fair dealing or fair use, all relevant 
factors shall be taken into account, including but not limited to— 
(i) the nature of the work in question; 
(ii) the amount and substantiality of the part of the work affected by the act in relation to the whole of the 
work; 
(iii)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether— 
(aa) such use serves a purpose different from that of the work affected; and 
(bb) it is of a commercial nature or for non-profit research, library or educational purposes; and 
(iv) the substitution effect of the act upon the potential market for the work in question. 
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(c) For the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b) and to the extent reasonably practicable and appropriate, the 
source and the name of the author shall be mentioned’.143 
Section 12A (a) and (b) are particularly confusing in the sense that they fail to 
describe the difference between ‘fair dealing’ and ‘fair use’.144 South Africa has currently 
adopted the ‘fair dealing’ exception, which creates an ambit within which the use of 
copyrighted work must fall in order to be lawful. In contrast, the United States of America 
has adopted the ‘fair use’ approach which tends to be an open-ended system of exceptions 
measured against a set of factors in order to determine whether a copyright has been 
infringed.145 This has been explained further in chapter four of the thesis. 
It is not entirely clear whether the proposal of s12A would amount to a system of fair 
dealing or fair use.146 The language used would cause confusion. However, the broadening 
of the fair-dealing doctrine proposed should be welcomed so as to promote the fair use of 
copyrighted works for information, educational and non-profit purposes.147 
The Bill further introduces s12B which provides that certain acts regarding the use of 
copyrighted works will not infringe copyrights so long as these acts fall within the ambit of 
fair use in s12A. These acts include the following: 
a) ‘Any quotation in the form of a summary of the original work; 
b) a teaching or any illustration in a publication, broadcast, sound or visual record; 
c) the reproduction of such work by a broadcaster intended exclusively for lawful broadcasts and 
destroyed before the expiration of a period of six months immediately following the date of the 
making of the reproduction; 
d) the reproduction in the press or by broadcasting of a lecture; 
e) reproduction by the press, in a broadcast, transmission or other communication to the public of an 
article published in a newspaper or periodical on current economic, political, religious topics, 
current events, a political speech or speech delivered in a legal proceeding; 
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f)  the translation of such work by a person giving or receiving instruction: Provided that the 
translation is not for commercial purposes and is used for personal, educational, teaching, judicial 
proceedings, research and professional advice purposes; 
g) the use of such work in a bona fide demonstration of electronic equipment; 
h) the use of such work is for the purposes of judicial proceedings; 
i) the reasonable use of such work for the purposes of cartoon, parody, satire, pastiche, tribute or 
homage; 
j) the making of a copy of such work by an individual of his own work or another person’s work for 
personal use.’148 
Section 12C provides for temporary reproduction and adaptation which allows a 
person to make transient and incidental copies of a work to enable transmission of the work 
in a network between 3rd parties by an intermediary or any other lawful use of that work.149 It 
also permits adaptation of work to allow for use on other devices, such as mobile devices.150  
Section 12D permits reproduction for educational purposes and academic activities 
where the copying does not exceed the extent justified by the purpose of education and 
research.151Given the fair use provision proposed in section 12A, the addition of section 12D 
appears to serve as a reinforcement to section 12A. 152  
Section 19C provides general exceptions regarding protection of copyright work for 
libraries, archives, museums and galleries.153 A library, archive, museum or gallery may 
without the authorisation of the copyright owner, use a copyright work to the extent of its 
educational and research activities if the work is not for commercial purposes.154 There is 
need for clarity in section 19C on  whether a for-profit archiving facility is entitled to rely on 
this exception.155  
Section 19D provides that any person may make an accessible format copy for a 
disabled person without the authorisation of the author.156 This can be done through non-
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commercial lending or by electronic communication or wireless means, and the undertaking 
of intermediate steps to achieve these objectives if certain conditions are met.157 The 
introduction of a general exception for persons with disabilities has been widely welcomed in 
order to promote access to information for people with disabilities.158   
Section 39B provides that to the extent that a contractual term does not permit the 
doing of an act which is by virtue of the Copyright Act lawful, or which attempts to renounce 
a right afforded by the Copyright Act, such a contractual term shall be unenforceable.159  
Given the complexity and nature of the Copyright Amendment Bill it raises a lot of 
concerns particularly relating to the distinction between fair use and fair dealing.160  The 
legislation does not consider well established principles of copyright law, especially 
considering that doctrines such as fair use, fair purpose and fair dealing are used 
interchangeably.161  
 In this sense, this research opines that the Amendment falls short of its intended 
purpose of modernising current existing copyright legislation. Considering the ambiguity and 
lack of clarity in the use of significant language such as ‘fair dealing’ and ‘fair use’, it would 
prove difficult to clearly interpret the meaning of such language used. However, the overlap 
present in sections 12A and 12D highlights a potential for the broad and inclusive  
interpretation of the language used. This overlap is also indicative of the fact that the Bill 
leans into the fair use approach more than it does the fair dealing approach.  Overall, while 
this Bill is a progressive step, it could benefit from providing clear definitions of the two 
approaches, ‘fair dealing’ and ‘fair use’, and could also be beneficial in classifying instances 
which would require either approach. The concluding chapter of this research will provide a 
more detailed analysis of the Amendment Bill, its short comings, as well as its criticisms. 
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d) The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 
 
The Intellectual Property Amendment Act 28 of 2013 (herein referred to as ‘the Amendment 
Act’) amends the Designs Act, Trade Marks Act, Performers Protection Act and the 
Copyright Act. The Amendment Act has been drafted to attempt to protect traditional 
knowledge through the existing intellectual property system.162   Section 4 of the Amendment 
Act inserts Chapter 2A into the Copyright Act after s28 of the Act, which essentially attempts 
to add two works into the existing list of works eligible for copyrights, these two works are: 
i. Traditional works; and 
ii. Indigenous cultural expressions or knowledge.163  
 
           The Amendment Act seems to be problematic with regard to how it changes the 
Copyright Act. Instead of amending specific sections of the Copyright Act to deal with 
traditional knowledge, the amendments are instead put together separately in chapter 2A to be 
inserted into the Copyright Act after s28. This highlights the need to provide a sui generis 
system to protect tradition and indigenous works.164  
 
           Dean argues that the rational way to protect traditional knowledge is to create a 
separate Act, one that is sui generis, because customised legislation addresses the 
peculiarities of a special kind of work such as traditional knowledge.  
 
3. COPYRIGHT AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
An obvious tension exists between copyright law and freedom of expression. Copyright 
inherently imposes restrictions on freedom of expression. The conflict arises out of the 
exclusive rights in original works given to the author to the exclusion of users and their 
freedom to access and use information which puts individual liberty and the public good at 
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risk.165 The courts apply the available statutory and common law principles when reconciling 
the rights arising from copyright ownership and freedom of expression.166 Holland states that 
research has shown that copyright legislation including both the Copyright Act as well as the 
regulations made under the Act, has been deficient in enabling access to knowledge. 
He argues that some restrictions on access to knowledge in copyright legislation 
disregard the right to freedom of expression. This has led to an erosion of the right of the 
public to disseminate information in favour of copyrights. As a result, private monopolies on 
information have limited the right to freedom of expression.  Dean states that in light of the 
Constitutional Court decision in the Laugh It Off case a defendant cannot rely on the right to 
freedom of expression unless there is a possibility of interpreting the relevant provisions of 
the Copyright Act pertaining to the claim in a constitutionally friendly manner that enables a 
reliance on the constitutional defence to be advanced.167 
Some scholars argue that because a copyright protects the expression of ideas and not 
the ideas themselves this means that copyright is not a barrier to the right to freedom of 
expression. They argue that a copyright does not prevent a person from repeating or making 
use of the ideas or information contained in a copyright protected work, but merely prevents a 
person from copying the form of expression used in the work.168  It has also been concluded 
by scholars that a proper application of the fair dealing defence in the Copyright Act can be 
used as a mechanism to balance the interests of copyright owners and users because it permits 
the unauthorised appropriation of protected expressions.169 
The defence provides that in certain limited circumstances, the unauthorized 
exploitation of an author’s work will not constitute a copyright infringement. Therefore, the 
defence is aimed at advancing the public interest of freedom of expression. Persons in society 
can rely on the defence in order to access and use copyrighted works for the purpose of 
criticising or reviewing original works.170 Although fair dealing has allowed for the fair use 
of copyright works, in certain cases the courts have pointed out that the defence is limited in 
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its ambit and ability to afford sufficient access to works. In many instances the defence does 
not suffice.171 It is therefore of importance to assess the shortcomings of the defence in order 
to determine how it can be developed to improve access to information and contribute to an 
appropriate balance between copyright and the right to freedom of expression.172  
It is important to consider two cases in which the court dealt with the fair dealing 
defence in advancing the right to freedom of expression namely the case of National Soccer 
League t/a Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd173 and Moneyweb (PTY) Limited v 
Media24 Limited & another174. When copyrights conflict with the public interest, the courts 
tend to attempt to strike a balance between maintaining public access to protected work and 
maintaining the authors right to the work. When relying on the fair dealing defence the 
defendant must prove that the work was used for one of the recognised purposes in s 12 (1) of 
the Copyright Act and that the work was dealt with fairly.  
In Soccer League t/a Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd the defendant argued 
that its unauthorised use of the copyright works (soccer fixture lists) was excused in terms of 
the fair dealing defence by reliance on the right to freedom to receive or impart information 
or ideas.175 The court decided to dismiss the defendant’s claim of fair dealing of the work 
because the defendant was engaged in a commercial mission, rather than just imparting 
information.176 In determining the matter the High Court adopted the approach of the 
Constitutional Court in Laugh It Off v SAB that the provisions of the Copyright Act must be 
interpreted in light of the Constitution in a manner that does not unduly infringe the 
defendant’s right to freedom of expression.177 
The court however found that an infringement with no purpose other than to generate 
commercial gain cannot be defended by the right to freedom of expression. It is noted that the 
court’s decision was based on the fact that the infringement was motivated by profit and that 
therefore the fair dealing defence was held not to be available to the defendant.178 Holland is 
of the opinion that this should not be how courts assess fairness, and that different factors 
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should be considered as a whole.179 Holland states further that the courts must clarify the 
correct approach to fair dealing for it to apply in a way that deals with the balance between 
copyright and freedom of expression adequately.180 
In the case of Laugh It Off v SAB judge Sachs stated something of importance with 
regards to the use of copyright works for commercial purposes. Judge Sachs found that it is 
of more significance to consider whether the activity of use is primarily communicative in 
character or primarily commercial. Some degree of commerce should not exclude the use of a 
copyright work from free speech, however there should be an element of social criticism.181  
In Moneyweb (PTY) Limited v Media24 Limited & another the court had to consider a 
copyright infringement matter between two competing online news-publishing companies. 
The case is of importance for this discussion because it was the first time that the fair dealing 
defence was considered by a South African court in terms of s12 (1) (c) of the Copyright Act. 
The constitutional mandate of the media to report news unrestrictedly and to inform the 
public makes it necessary to consider the effects of the existing copyright regime on this 
mandate.182  
Moneyweb (the applicant) and Media24 (the first respondent) are in the industry of 
online publishing of articles on the internet and other digital platforms. Moneyweb sought a 
declaratory order against Media24, under the banner of Fin24, for unlawful publication of 
seven articles.183 Moneyweb had published seven articles on its website which Fin24 
republished, although not in verbatim. Moneyweb contended that the articles were unlawfully 
copied.184 The court had to decide three aspects of the matter: first, whether Moneyweb’s 
articles were original; secondly, once originality was proved, whether Media24 had 
reproduced a substantial part of the relevant article; and, thirdly, whether Media24’s 
reproduction of the Moneyweb articles falls within the ambit of the defence of fair dealing in 
s12 (1) (c) (i) and the exception in 12 (8) (a) which excludes mere items of press information 
from copyright protection.185  
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The court set out the context within which the fair dealing test should be interpreted, 
namely against the values, principles and fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
The court indicated that the exclusive rights of the author and the right to freedom of 
expression will not clash with each other, as the enquiry should start by reading s 6 of the Act 
(the exclusive rights of an author) and s 12 (1) of the Act (the fair dealing provision) together 
and then interpreting s 12 (1) in a manner that would be in line with the right to freedom of 
expression. The court stated that the infringing act must be considered only once it is shown 
that a substantial part of the copyright work was reproduced. Thereafter the court 
recommended that the test for fair dealing laid out in the Ashdown case above should be used 
to determine whether in fact the defendant can rely on the fair dealing defence. The court 
found that Fin24 could not rely on the defence because, amongst other factors, a substantial 
portion of Moneyweb’s work was copied in verbatim without any reason why Fin24 did not 
contribute more of its own work to the article.  
To adequately balance copyright and the right to freedom of expression it is clear that 
the courts must adopt strategies of striking the balance. Scholars argue that a more adequate 
approach to fair dealing can be achieved by removing artificial limitations to the defence, and 
that there would be a need to take a broader and all-encompassing approach to assessing 
fairness.186 This would give courts more discretion to make an informed decision based on 
the facts whether a particular dealing is fair in a case. The current ambit of the fair dealing 
defence is inadequate because of how entire classes of use have been found to automatically 
fall outside of the ambit of the defence.   
4. CONCLUSION 
The Copyright Act was enacted back in 1978 before the modern technological age. Copyright 
law needs to be modified in a way that takes into consideration the rampant copyright 
infringement that occurs on a day to day basis in South Africa. The development of the 
copyright law needs to protect the legitimate private property rights of the copyright owner. 
Given that South Africa is a constitutional democracy, the fundamental values in the Bill of 
Rights have to be considered when reforming legislation. In this regard there is a need to 
determine whether copyright law meets the needs of the right to freedom of expression. The 
public interest of accessing and using information needs to be considered and the best 
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approach in determining the ambit and application of the fair dealing provision needs to be 
developed. In pursuit of these objectives the next chapter will consider the copyright 
legislation in the United States of America.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States of America (herein referred to as USA), where society has transformed 
from being an industrial to an information and service-based society, the importance of 
protecting copyright has been realised. The post-industrial era is marked by rapid technical 
change in which the ability to reproduce and receive information has grown exponentially.187 
Individuals have become increasingly linked by digital networks, including the internet.188 
The value of communicative expression has grown. The legal structure that governs 
ownership of creative expression has had to keep up with all these developments. 
Products of the mind are protected under three branches of federal law, which is 
collectively known as ‘intellectual property’. One of these three branches is copyright law 
which protects original works of authorship. Copyright, as a form of intellectual property 
protection, is rooted in the United States Constitution of 1787. The foundation of copyright 
law is found in Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution which provides 
that: 
‘Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for a limited 
time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’189 
The statute protecting copyrights in the United States is the Copyright Act of 1976 
(herein referred to as the US Copyright Act).190  The US Copyright Act prevents the 
unauthorized copying of a work of authorship. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1989 signifies the United States’ entry into the Berne Convention. Although the US 
Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne Convention Implantation Act of 1989 have been 
brought into effect, the US Copyright Act of 1909 (hereafter referred to as the 1909 
Copyright Act) remains relevant. This is because the copyright legislation subsequent to the 
1909 Act does not extend retroactive protection to domestic works.191Copyright in the works 
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which entered the public domain under the 1909 Act is not revived by the later Acts. The 
Copyright Act of 1976 specifically incorporated provisions of the prior law and retained 
certain standards in the 1909 Act for important issues such as originality and infringement.192  
 
2. THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
a) The United States Copyright Act 1976  
i. Categories of works eligible for copyright  
The categories of copyrightable subject matter in the US Copyright Act includes literary 
works, musical works (including any accompanying words), dramatic works (including any 
accompanying music), pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works, sound recordings, motion pictures and other audio-visual works, and 
architectural works.193  Literary works include works other than audio-visual works, 
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phono records, 
film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.194 Motion pictures are audio-visual 
works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an 
impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.195 
Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art 
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including 
architectural plans.196 Sound recordings are works that result from the fixation of a series of 
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion 
picture or other audio-visual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as 
disks, tapes, or other phono-records, in which they are embodied.197  
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ii. Duration of copyright  
 
The provisions dealing with duration of copyright in the US Copyright Act are complex. 
Different standards apply depending on whether a copyright was secured before, on, or after 
the US Copyright Act came into effect on 1 January 1978. In addition, amendments have 
been made since this date, thus affecting duration.  For the purposes of this dissertation it is 
important to look at the duration of copyright works created after 1 January 1978. Copyright 
subsists a term of the authors life plus an additional 70 years. For joint work, copyright 
subsists for the life of the authors plus 70 years after the last surviving author. 198  
 
iii. Identifying the author 
 
The Act provides guidelines for identifying a person who qualifies as the author of a 
copyright. Copyright in a work protected under the Act initially belongs to the author who 
created that work.199 The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work 
because when two or more authors create a single work with the intention of merging their 
contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole, the authors are 
considered joint authors and have an indivisible interest in the work as a whole.200 If multiple 
authors contribute to a collective work with no intention of merging their contributions, each 
authors’ individual contribution is separate and distinct from the copyright ownership in the 
collective work as a whole.201  
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work 
was authored is considered the author, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in 
writing and have signed.202 The US Copyright Act accords to the copyright owner exclusive 
rights to reproduce the work; to prepare derivative works from the original; to distribute 
copies of the protected work to the public; to perform the work; and to display the work 
publicly.203 
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Section 104 of the Copyright Act deals with copyright by virtue of nationality, 
domicile or residence, and duration of copyright. It states copyright of unpublished works is 
subject to protection under the Act without regard to the nationality or domicile of the author. 
With regards to published works the Act states that copyright is automatically conferred in 
every work, eligible for copyright, of which the author or, in the case of a work of joint 
authorship, any one of the authors is at the time the work is a person who is a citizen of the 
United States of America or is domiciled in the country.204     
The section also deals with copyright by reference to country of origin, a copyright is 
conferred on eligible works whereby the copyright was first published in the United States of 
America or in a foreign nation that, on the date of first publication, is a Berne Convention 
treaty party. 205 
 
iv. Requirement for works to be eligible for copyrights 
 
In terms of s102 (a) of the US Copyright Act copyright exists automatically in an original 
work of authorship once it is fixed in a tangible medium, but a copyright owner can take steps 
to strengthen the protection of their copyright, the most important of which is registering the 
work. The registration of a work is not mandatory for works originating from the United 
States- registration is only necessary for enforcing an exclusive right of copyright through 
litigation.206 The standards of the eligibility of a copyright in the USA are therefore based on 
a work being one of the works eligible for copyright protection under the US Copyright Act 
and satisfying two fundamental criteria, namely originality and fixation in a tangible form. 
 
The phrase ‘original works of authorship’ is purposely left undefined in the US 
Copyright Act. It is intended that the meaning of originality incorporates without changing 
the standard of originality established by the courts under the common law and the 1909 US 
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Copyright Act.207 Originality does not include novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit.208 A 
work is original even where the subject matter results from a process of selecting, bringing 
together, organizing and arranging previously existing material regardless of whether the 
individual items in the material have been or ever could have been subject to copyright. A 
work is eligible for copyright if the work is formed by the collection and assembling of pre-
existing material or of data that has been arranged in such a way that the resulting work of an 
author as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.209      
Originality means that the work was independently created by the author and is not 
copied from other works. The work must possess a degree of creativity or ‘skill on the part of 
a person seeking a valid copyright. Other courts refer to a degree of labour or the ‘sweat of 
the brow’ in determining whether the originality requirement is met. In the leading case of 
Holmes v Hurst210  the court found that the right secured by copyright is not a right to use 
certain words, as words are the common property of society, nor is it a right to ideas alone. A 
copyright secures the right to an arrangement of words which the author has selected to 
express his ideas.211 The most important aspect of originality is that in each case, the requisite 
amount of skill and labour must be determined in light of the subject matter.212 
Justice Story articulated the requirement of originality in Gray v Russell213 and 
established a minimal standard of originality. An objective test is applied in assessing 
whether a work is indeed an original. Emphasis was placed on the necessity that the work for 
which protection is sought be independently created. An original work is independently 
created, owing its origin to an author. Justice Story effectively composed a standard which 
permitted copyright to exist in a work which was prepared with the authors’ own skill and 
labour, where skill and labour were viewed as equivalent. An author’s skill and labour states 
a standard that a work is protectable if it is not copied. The work must thus contain at least a 
certain minimum of original creative expression.214  
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The work must demonstrate a minimal amount of creative authorship. Almost any 
distinguishable variation of a prior work will constitute a sufficient quantity of originality. In 
determining whether a work meets the requirement of originality the work must be evaluated 
as a whole.215  In Emerson v Davies216 Justice Story stated that the question is not whether the 
contents of the work are entirely new. The correct approach is to determine whether the 
combination of ideas has been used before for the same purpose or any other purpose. If an 
author has borrowed materials from others, but he combination of the expression of his ideas 
is different from what existed before then he is entitled to a copyright in his work.217  
The work must consist of ‘expression’ and not just ideas. The distinction between an 
idea and an expression is known as the idea-expression dichotomy. The fixation requirement 
is stated in two portions of the US Copyright Act. Section 102 (a) of the US Copyright Act 
states that a work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Fixation also plays a role 
in determining whether a person has infringed a copyright. S102 (b) denies protection to any 
idea, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery. A work satisfies 
the requirement of fixation if it is placed in a relatively stable and permanent embodiment. 
The work must therefore be recorded or written in some manner. For example, only literary 
works that qualify as writings may claim federal copyright protection. It is required that the 
work take some material form capable of identification and have some level of permanent 
endurance. To obtain a copyright an author must therefore ensure that the work is reduced to 
a relatively stable form. Only then can the author enforce a copyright over the work.218   
 
v. Registration of copyright 
 
The US Copyright Act gives authors the right to register their copyrights. Section 410 (a) of 
the US Copyright Act directs the registrar of copyrights to register any claim to a copyright 
which constitutes copyrightable subject matter. Copyrightable subject matter refers to works 
that meet the formal requirements of originality and fixation in a tangible form mentioned 
above. The registrar may refuse registration if the work does not constitute copyrightable 
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subject matter. Regardless of the nature of the work which is submitted for registration, the 
same standard is applied to all.219  
The test applied by an examiner in determining whether a work is registrable is- 
1. Whether the work falls within the subject matter of copyright; and 
2. Whether the work represents an original work of authorship.220 
 
The Copyright Office has promulgated a number of guidelines with regards to 
registration of original works of authorship. However during litigation, it is ultimately for a 
court to decide on whether a work is protected under copyright law. A certificate of 
registration serves an important purpose because it holds more weight in deciding matters 
involving copyright infringement. The function of the Copyright Office is to establish a clear, 
accurate and understandable public record of copyright. It also serves the function of 
excluding from the record any unjustified copyright claims. Section 410 (c) states that in any 
judicial proceedings the certification of a registration made before or within five years after 
the first publication of the work constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.221   
An author does not need to register their copyright. However, for works of United 
States origin copyright registration is required before the copyright owner can commence a 
copyright infringement litigation in a court. Section 411(a) of the US Copyright Act provides 
that no civil action for infringement of a copyright in any work of United States origin shall 
be instituted until registration of the copyright has been made. On the issue of whether actual 
issuance of a registration is required or whether a completed application submitted to the 
Copyright Office suffices, the courts have been divided. Some courts have found that a 
completed application submitted to the Copyright Office suffices. The issue has been raised 
in the Supreme Court in the case of Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v Wall-
stress.com.222 The Supreme Court is yet to decide the issue conclusively.223   
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vi. Infringement of copyrights 
 
Copyright over a work gives an author certain exclusive rights with regards to that work. The 
Copyright Act provides that an author has exclusive rights over their works: 
• To reproduce the copyrighted work; 
• To prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; 
• To distribute copies of the work to the public; 
• To perform the work publicly if the work is literary, musical, dramatic, or 
choreographic works, pantomimes, audio-visual works and motion pictures; 
• To display the work publicly if the work is literary, musical, dramatic, or 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works; 
• To perform the work publicly by means of digital audio transmission if it is a 
sound recording; and 
• To control the importation of copyrighted works into the United States.224  
 
The author’s copyright is infringed if any person performs an act with regards to the 
copyrighted work that violates one or more of the author’s exclusive rights. This is subject to 
certain limitations and exceptions which will be dealt with below.225 Giving the author 
exclusive rights implies that other persons must not exercise the rights without the consent of 
the copyright owner. In the West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co226 the court, when 
explaining the concept of copyright infringement, found that infringement consists of the 
violation of an exclusive right, to reproduce copies of the original production. The court 
stated that an infringement does not take place unless there has been a copying of the work 
which consists of the exact or substantial reproduction of the original.227 In Emerson v 
Davies228 the court found that the test for infringement is whether the defendant has in fact 
used the authors work as a model for his own, or whether the defendant’s work is the result of 
his own labour and skill, and the resemblances between the works are either accidental or are 
due to the nature of the subject.229  
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Certain elements must be established before an infringement can be proved.230 First, 
the authors work must satisfy the requirements for originality set out above. Secondly, the 
defendant must have had the opportunity to copy the authors work. Thirdly, there must have 
been a copying in some form of the copyrighted work which means that there must be a 
causal connection between the author’s original work and the alleged infringing work. 
Whether copying has taken place is dependent on a comparison of the similarities between 
the works. Where there are substantial similarities between the works and access is not 
excluded by the facts there is a strong inference that the work was copied.231  
Lastly there must be a substantial appropriation of the copyright work. Some of the 
most important factors to be considered are: whether the author’s labour has been 
appropriated; the value of the part copied; the decrease in the value of the copyrighted work; 
and the relative value and purpose served by the part copied.232 The test is an objective one 
and requires an inquiry into whether the similarities between the works in question could be 
recognised by the ordinary observation and not fine analysis.233 
 
vii. Remedies for copyright infringements 
 
The most important remedy offered to authors for copyright infringement is monetary 
recovery. The US Copyright Act provides for an award of damages for compensation to the 
author. Damages are awarded to prevent the infringer from obtaining an unjustified 
enrichment and to deter future infringement. Other remedies such as injunction, impounding, 
and destruction are not often used. The remedy of criminal sanctions is available to authors 
however it is not utilised in practice.234 Courts have the discretion to award actual damages to 
an author.235 The quantum of damages is equal to the actual damage suffered or the profits 
which the infringer made. The common method of calculating actual damages is in the 
amount of lost sales or lost profits.236   
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Courts also have the discretion of awarding statutory damages in lieu of actual 
damages and profits.237 In terms of the US Copyright Act the courts must award such 
damages as to what the court deems just. The US Copyright Act provides a scale which the 
court can use to guide it. The statutory amounts apply to each copyright infringed. If multiple 
reproductions of a single copyright work are made they constitute a single infringement.238 
Statutory damages may be awarded where actual damages are either impossible or difficult to 
ascertain. In F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc239the court found that in the 
exercise of judicial discretion a court may award statutory damages even where actual 
damages are proven, if it estimates that applying statutory limits is more just.240 
In addition, the US Copyright Act provides for other remedies such as a judicial order 
restraining a person from beginning or continuing to infringe the copyright of the copyright 
order. This court order is known as an injunction (the United States version of an interdict).241 
The US Copyright Act also allows for the impounding and destruction of the infringing 
copies and devices within the court’s discretion.242 Impounding the infringing work is used 
either to ensure that the defendant complies with a court order or to secure the copies for 
destruction.243 Destruction is a drastic remedy which requires the court to use its discretion.244  
The US Copyright Act also makes wilful infringement of a copyright an act 
punishable by imprisonment or a fine if the infringement was committed for purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, by the reproduction or distribution, including 
by electronic means; or by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial 
distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the 
public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial 
distribution.245 Criminal infringement is punishable by imprisonment or a fine.246  
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viii. General copyright exceptions and limitations 
 
A work that is copyright protected under the US Copyright Act may be subject to being 
reproduced or used, whether in part or substantially, without a person obtaining permission 
from the copyright owner. The US Copyright Act does contain specific limitations and 
exceptions with regards to the different categories of works and kinds of works. The 
following exceptions are provided for in the Act: Fair use (s107); Reproduction by libraries 
and archives (s108); Effect of transfer of particular copy or phono-record (s109); Exemption 
of certain performances and displays (s110); Secondary transmissions of broadcast 
programming by cables (s111); Ephemeral recordings (s112). 
 
It is useful for the purpose of this dissertation to consider the fair use exception and 
limitation to copyright which is the United States version of the fair dealing defence in South 
Africa. The way in which the United States has interpreted the concept of fair use is 
important in our analysis of the public interest of access to information and freedom of 
expression protected by exceptions to copyright.247  
Section 107 of the US Copyright Act states that the fair use of a copyrighted work for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. The section 
goes on further to provide four factors to be considered in establishing whether the use that 
has been made of a work is a fair use of the work. The four factors are:  
1. The purpose and character of the use; 
2. The nature of the copyrighted work; 
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work; 
and 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.248 
 
The first factor deals with the purpose and character of the use of a copyrighted work. 
It includes an examination of whether the copies were made for commercial (profit) use or 
for non-profit educational purposes. If a person uses copyrighted works for a non-profit 
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educational purpose such as making copies for students as part of a learning experience, then 
the first factor is satisfied.249 The second factor deals with the nature of the work used. It 
includes an examination of the form that the original work is in and how it has been 
expressed in tangible form. For example, if an original work is unpublished it would not be 
fair for another person to make that work public by making copies. Similarly using a factual 
work is more likely to amount to fair use than using a creative work.250  
The third factor examines the quantity of the original copyrighted work that has been 
used. For example, where a lesser amount of an original work has been used or copied by a 
lecturer for a class the fair use exception may be relied upon. However, where the lecturer 
uses the whole of the original work such as a book and reproduces it for students he cannot 
rely on fair use.251 In Basic Books Inc. v Kinko’s Graphics Corp.252 the court found that an act 
of copying and selling entire exact chapters or substantial portions from Basic Books 
copyrighted books without permission was not fair use.  The last factor deals with the effects 
the use has on the potential market for the copyrighted work. In Sony Corp of America v 
Universal City Studios253 the court found that fair use cannot be relied upon generally where 
the user will make money from the use of an original work.254 It was found further that there 
is no burden on the author to prove actual harm or certainty of future harm.255 
 
b) The relationship between copyright and freedom of expression 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution contains the right to freedom of 
expression and declares that ‘[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the [g]overnment for a 
redress of grievances’.256 The right to freedom of speech (including freedom of the press) 
protects a person’s right to freely express themselves. Copyright and freedom of expression 
have often been considered to be harmonious and complementary concepts. For instance, in 
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Harper and Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises257 the USA’s Supreme Court characterized 
copyright law as the ‘engine of free expression’.258 However copyright by its very nature has 
a history of hostility against freedom of expression values as much as it has a history of being 
an engine of free expression.259  
The attempt to balance copyright and the freedom of expression in the United States 
of America can be seen from the idea-expression dichotomy. The fact that copyright only 
extends to an authors’ ‘expression’, not the ‘ideas’ or information that a work contains is the 
basic internal mechanism to accommodate copyright and free expression.260 If copyright did 
extend to ideas there would certainly be an encroachment on freedom of expression. The 
individuals in society are generally free to express the same ideas or reuse information 
derived from an author’s work in a subsequent work as long as he or she expresses 
information in a different way. This limits the potential for private censorship in copyright.261 
The idea-expression dichotomy functions effectively in situations in which the purpose of 
free speech is served by effectively preserving free access to ideas.262 The ‘substantial 
similarity’ test for copyright infringement also provides a necessary limitation on the 
protection of copyright in favour of free speech. A copyright infringement only occurs if 
there has been a substantial similarity between the author’s original and another work.263 
The US Copyright Act has broadened the granting of exclusive rights given to authors 
whilst narrowing the scope of copyright through public interest limitations and exceptions on 
copyright, including fair use. The law of copyright balances copyright and freedom of 
expression by preventing the commercial and public uses of copyrighted works, whilst 
allowing private and non-commercial uses of works. This legislative approach is conceived 
as promoting learning and public access to knowledge, thereby achieving the societal goal of 
freedom of expression. The open-ended factors for determining fair use have even given rise 
to the defence of parody in using copyrighted work.264 The doctrine of fair use allows for a 
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more extensive borrowing of copyrighted material than does the substantial similarity 
requirement. It operates as a defence even where there has been a substantial use of an 
author’s work. The fair use doctrine has contributed to the balance between copyright and 
freedom of expression. There have been a few cases that have dealt with the relationship 
between copyright law and freedom of expression.265  
In Rosemont Enterprises v Random House Inc.266 the plaintiff approached the court 
for a preliminary injunction barring a publication and distribution of a biography of the public 
figure, Howard Hughes. The plaintiff argued that the biography infringed its copyright in 
three articles about Hughes that it had published. The articles combined contained 13 500 
words and biography had about 116 000 words.  The court a quo granted the injunction on the 
basis that the biography had quoted 265 words from the articles. The defendant also conceded 
that an additional 80 words had been paraphrased. The court a quo found at least twelve more 
instances of paraphrasing.267 The final court (Second Circuit) rejected the finding of the court 
a quo and the preliminary injunction on the basis of the doctrine of fair use.  
The final court rejected the findings of the court a quo that the defendant’s 
commercial motives prevented application of the fair use doctrine. The court emphasised the 
social value of the biographers work and found that a preliminary injunction would deprive 
the public of an opportunity to learn more about the life of Hughes, who had extraordinary 
talents and had made substantial contributions in the fields to which he had devoted his 
abilities. The court found further that in balancing the conflicting interests, the public’s 
interests should prevail over the possible damage to the copyright owner.268  The court 
therefore effectively applied the fair use doctrine to promote the right to free speech.269 The 
decision shows the pivotal role that the public interest of free speech can play in applying the 
fair use doctrine.  
In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface Inc.270 the court placed emphasis 
on the four-factor test applied in the fair use doctrine. The case illustrates a modern 
application of fair use. The defendant was in the process of publishing a twenty-two-volume 
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personal name index to the New York Times index, which is published by the New York 
Times. The New York Times publishes an annual index which lists under separate headings 
references to pages and columns of the New York Times newspapers where information 
based on a topic or person appears.271  The defendant’s index consisted of personal names 
directly taken from the New York Times annual indices with citations to pages of the index 
on which references to names appear. The New York Times approached the court for a 
preliminary injunction, arguing that copying names from its annual index amounted to a 
copyright infringement.272 Although the US Copyright Act was not yet in effect the court 
applied the criteria in s 107 to decide whether to allow the fair use defence.  
In terms of the first factor the court considered the purpose and character of the use. 
The court found that the defendant’s use served two purposes to attempt to turn a profit and 
to serve the public interest in the dissemination of information. The court held that a 
commercial motive is relevant to its determination. However, a commercial motive did not 
preclude fair use. The court found further that recognition of the public interest of 
dissemination of information is a relevant factor in assessing whether the purpose and 
character of the use permits the fair use doctrine to assist in accommodating copyright and 
freedom of speech.273  
In terms of the second factor the court stated that the nature of the copyrighted work is 
more a product of diligence than creativity. In this case the court found that the fair use 
doctrine should allow for more freedom of use than it might for more original works.274In 
terms of the third factor the court found that a quantitative test was inadequate because it does 
not consider the importance of the appropriated material and any necessity that may arise to 
sue portions of copyrighted work in order to prepare the defendant’s work. The court noted 
that the defendant could not publish its personal name index without copying the names from 
the New York Times Index. Denicola states that this necessity criterion represents a 
mechanism within the fair use doctrine for incorporating free speech values to copyright law. 
When a prohibition on the use of material amounts to a prohibition on the production and 
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distribution of a work that would serve the public interest in dissemination of information, the 
fair use doctrine tends to favour permitting the use.275 
Lastly the court dealt with the fourth factor which is the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The court found that the defendant’s 
work did not compete with Times Index. The defendant’s work only contained citations to 
the Times Index and did not serve as a substitute for the Times Index.276  
After considering all four factors the court held that the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s materials is justified by the fair use doctrine. This case illustrates how the fair use 
doctrine has been used to ease the conflict between copyright law and free speech. The fair 
use doctrine focuses on the public interest in the flow of information. At the same time, it 
seeks to ensure that the interests of the copyright owner are not encroached upon 
needlessly.277 Another area in which the fair use doctrine has been successful is in situations 
involving the use of copyrighted material in parodies. The doctrine has been largely 
successful in balancing copyright and free speech principles in this regard.  
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.278 the court found that parody and satire are 
deserving of substantial freedom as entertainment and as a form of social and literary 
criticism. The use of parody or satire has neither the intention nor effect of substituting for an 
original work or the demand for it. Where a parodist does not use a greater amount of the 
original work that is necessary to create the object of his satire, a finding of infringement 
would be improper.279    
 
c) The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (herein referred to as the DMCA) is a statute that 
amends the US Copyright Act and addresses the new obligations in the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright and Performance and Phonograms Treaties (hereafter referred to as the WIPO 
Copyright Treaties).  These obligations are concerned with the modernisation of the 
copyright legislation to meet the challenges of digital creation, communication, and 
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exploitation of copyright works. The first obligation requires contracting countries to afford 
adequate protection and provide effective legal remedies against circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of protecting 
their copyrights.280 The DMCA came into effect on the 27th of October 1998.  
The DMCA was thus created to provide adequate protection against persons who 
circumvent access to copyright works on digital platforms and manufacturers, importers and 
distributors of the devices that are produced and used to circumvent access to works. The 
above WIPO obligations placed on contracting countries requires that legislation permits 
circumvention of a technological measure, that restricts copying, that would qualify as a fair 
use.281 While it may be fair use to make non-profit research copies of pages from a lawfully 
acquired book it is not fair use to circumvent access to copyright works on digital platforms. 
This would amount to stealing the work in order to make copies, which is what the DMCA 
prevents.282  
The new section 12(1) of the US Copyright Act now defines three new violations of 
copyright: 
1. To circumvent technological protection measures that control access to copyrighted 
works 
2. To manufacture, disseminate or offer devices or services that circumvent access 
controls to copyright work; and 
3. To manufacture, disseminate, or offer devices that circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively protects a right of the copyright owner.283 
 
These violations are distinct from copyright infringement. It is not necessary to prove 
that the dissemination of circumvention devices resulted in a specific infringement. The 
DMCA strengthens protection of copyright in the digital age. The aim and purpose of the 
legislation is to prohibit persons from circumventing technological measures that control 
access to copyrighted works.284 Although the DMCA serves the purpose of protecting 
virtually all digitally stored information against copyright infringement it has encroached 
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upon certain established copyright law principles. First, the statute does not permit a copy for 
personal use, nor does it provide for small amounts of copying which is usually permitted 
under the fair use doctrine.285 Secondly, the DMCA allows authors and publishing entities to 
limit or prevent access to works that the public would otherwise have access to in exercising 
their right to freedom of expression. This means that the DMCA fails to strike a balance 
between copyrights and the right to freedom of expression as has been the emphasis of this 
discussion. The DMCA therefore fails to permit dissemination of knowledge and 
education.286 
 
3. CONCLUSION  
The question which has to be answered is how the copyright legislative framework in the 
United States can be used to develop South African copyright law in a way that provides 
more adequate protection for the owner’s copyright and balances copyright with the right to 
freedom of expression. In this dissertation it is argued that copyright protection needs to be 
developed to provide authors with sufficient protection against copyright infringement. It is 
of importance to consider the United States approach in providing protection for copyright. 
The reason for copyright protection is to encourage creativity and stimulate the development 
and dissemination of information and knowledge.287 
These legitimate interests must be protected. It is also argued in this dissertation that 
South African copyright law does not balance copyright and the right to freedom of 
expression in a way that sufficiently promotes access and dissemination of information. It is 
suggested that a broader application of the fair dealing doctrine would be conducive to 
promoting the legitimate public interest of access to information. There is a danger of 
providing excessive protection to copyright owners in that it would encroach on the user’s 
right to access copyright works. It is therefore necessary to develop copyright law with 
caution. The next chapter will draw conclusions and suggest recommendations that could be 
implemented in order to balance adequate protection for the author’s copyright and the public 
interests protected by the right to freedom of expression.     
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concluding chapter recommends solutions for the weaknesses of the South African 
copyright legislative framework. Authors are entitled to adequate protection of their 
copyright and to reap the benefits from the works that they create. However, authors’ 
copyrights have to be balanced against the rights of the public to freedom of expression. This 
dissertation has discussed two problems which need to be dealt with. The first issue is the 
high level of copyright infringement of owners’ works in South Africa. The second issue 
faced by copyrights users is their inability to access and use works which serve the public 
interest. The accessibility of informative and educational work has serious implications in the 
development of a developing state such as South Africa, which is why development of 
copyright law should be done in a way that does not encroach upon the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression.288  
The purpose of copyright protection is to encourage creativity by rewarding authors 
for their works. The result of overprotection of copyrights is that the public will be deprived 
of important information which would contribute to the creation of more informative and 
creative work.289 Therefore, the overprotection of copyrights would stifle creativity instead of 
serving its obligation to encourage it. It is argued that the inability of law makers to provide 
efficient ways in which exceptions and limitations to copyrights can sufficiently promote 
dissemination of important works, amounts to lawmakers losing sight of the importance of 
copyright protection.290  
Balancing the interests of copyright owners and users in the interest of public welfare 
is not an easy task. It is not argued that improving copyright protection should not mean that 
the rights of the user are encroached upon.291 Instead protection should improve the certainty 
of an author’s copyright. Through providing more certainty over copyright ownership, the 
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original goal of copyright law, which is to encourage the authors to create and rewarding 
them for their creations, will be achieved.292   
The South African Copyright Act came into effect in 1976. The Act is outdated 
because it does not consider the constitutional fundamental rights that do not coincide with its 
provisions. Furthermore, it does not take into consideration any technological advancements 
and new ways in which copyrighted works are used. Certain provisions of the Act are not in 
line with the modern fundamental values of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. For 
example, the statutory exceptions and limitations in the Act and the regulations do not set out 
a broad ambit in which the fundamental right to freedom of expression can be considered in 
matters involving use of copyright work.293  
This research suggests the following copyright reforms for consideration:  
a) The introduction of a form of copyright registration; 
b) Limiting the period of protection; and 
c) Improving the current landscape of copyright exceptions and limitations 
 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
a) Introduction of copyright registration 
The requirements of ‘originality’ and ‘material form’ for the substance of a copyright 
efficiently ensure that only a work that has intellectually originated form the author is 
protected. The Copyright Act promotes the interests of authors far more than the interests of 
individuals to access information. However, the high levels of copyright infringements in 
South Africa do not reflect the high level of protection for copyright that the Copyright Act 
gives to authors of these works. It is the view of this study that the failure of the Copyright 
Act to make provision for any optional form of registration of copyrights, leads to a general 
disregard for copyright works as a form of private property belonging to an author. Some 
form of optional registration should be made possible. This can be done by establishing a 
copyright registry. Once a copyright has been established and registered the author would 
then have a clear right to the work belonging to him and this would lead to better protection 
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of his copyright during an application for an interdict against infringement or for a claim for 
copyright infringement damages.294  
A lesson which can be learnt from the United States of America’s copyright system is that 
registration would establish a public record of the copyright claim and the work would be 
indexed in the Copyright Office records, under the works title and the author’s name. This 
would be beneficial for the protection of authors’ works, as records of copyright registration 
would be available to the public who would be able to ascertain who owns the copyright. 
Finding the author would be easier and access to works would also be improved as the public 
would be able to determine whether a copyright has expired and vests in the public domain. 
Authors who have no interest in copyright protection would not register their works, where 
such works would more easily vest in the public domain for use.295  
It is realistic in South Africa to have a formal registration system for copyright works. 
Although there is a financial and technological capacity difference between South Africa and 
the United States of America, our legal system itself must be progressive.296 Copyright is a 
form of intellectual property, but like other forms of property it exists by virtue of its 
recognition by the state through legislation.297 Laws protecting property need more than just 
to be written. In order to be legitimised, property laws need some form of registration of 
ownership.298  There is no reason why South Africa cannot establish a Copyright Office. 
Establishing a Copyright Office would be a formidable task to undertake, however despite the 
daunting task, there is a legitimate justification for the existence of a Copyright Office, and 
that justification is primarily economic. The main purpose of granting authors copyright is to 
support a structure in which authors have the opportunity to be reworded for their works.299 
This purpose relies on some functions of copyright formalities which play a role in providing 
notice about the identity of the author, the work, and the exclusive rights that exist in the 
work.300  
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b) Limiting the period of copyright protection    
While it is important to provide adequate protection for copyright owners, it is not necessary 
to extend exclusive rights beyond the terms and scope required by international treaties. The 
Berne Convention requires that copyrights in photographs subsist for 25 years. However, the 
Copyright Act grants copyright protection in photographs for 50 years. The Berne 
Convention also provides that copyright for works made public after the author’s death 
should subsist for 50 years after the author’s death.301 The Copyright Act grants protection 
for much longer if the work is published after the author has died. Copyright legislation 
should reduce the duration of copyright with regards to these works, considering that South 
Africa is developing country. 
The result of an extended protection of copyright in photographs is that archives and 
places of historical records such as museums are restricted from digitising photographs to 
preserve them. This results in loss or degeneration of significant historical photographs.302 
There is no rational basis for extending the protection of copyright for works published after 
the author’s death beyond 50 years because the objective of copyright law is to give 
incentives for creation and the communication of that creativity.303 The duration of 
copyrights should be applied more restrictively and in line with its international obligations 
so as to afford better access to these works. The duration of the copyright must also be 
balanced against the cost of that protection. The implications for South Africa as a 
developing country are such that extending copyright duration means that works take longer 
to fall into the public domain, thus stifling development.304 The only rationale for extending 
copyright protection past the international requirements would be to promote the progress of 
science and the arts. In this regard there is no need to provide copyright protection for 
photographs over 25 years. There is also no need to extend copyright protection for over 50 
years after the death of the author.305  
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c) Improving the current landscape of copyright exceptions and limitations 
The fair dealing provision of the Copyright Act is essential for the purpose of promoting 
freedom of expression. The provision supports the fundamental right to artistic creativity, 
freedom of the press and media, and access to information and learning material.  The 
specified exceptions in the fair dealing provision (s12 (1) of the Copyright Act) require that a 
person brings the use of a copyright work within its ambit. Any use of the work that does not 
fall into the ambit of fair dealing amounts to a copyright infringement.306 This places 
stringent limitations on the right to freedom of expression. 
Copyright legislation should therefore clarify the scope of fair dealing. As previously 
iterated in chapter two, South Africa has made insufficient use of the flexibilities that may be 
contained in the fair use doctrine. A good use of the doctrine would support the overall 
objective of copyright law to maintain a fair balance between the legitimate interest of the 
copyright owners and the public interest in accessing information. It is recommended that 
South African copyright law must include in the Copyright Act a proper test for fairness. 
South Africa should borrow from the United States of America’s fair use clause which 
contains the broad four step test for fairness.307   
The Amendment Bill forms an instrumental part of the manner in which copyright 
laws will develop in South Africa going forward. It is however, needless to say that behind 
the backdrop of a constantly evolving and changing socio-economic atmosphere, legislators 
have found it increasingly difficult to remain abreast with all these legislative adaptations. It 
is therefore in this light that South Africa should seek to adopt useful approaches which have 
been used by foreign jurisdictions that are more advanced in the field of copyright law. As 
provided by the research, the United States provides a solid example of one such comparator. 
More attention needs to be given to the language used, and assigning of specific 
meaning and definition to the use of significant words and phrases would be helpful in 
providing clarity and a strong sense of direction. It is perhaps the suggested fairness test that 
would benefit from being more loosely defined. This would be done to be more inclusive to a 
wider variety of scenarios in the fair dealing/ fair use approach. While expecting the  
Amendment Bill to contain within it the holy grail of South African copyright law, all in one 
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seating, is an unrealistic expectation, it would be within reason to require that certain 
improvements and recommendations suggested above be included first before the passing of 
this Bill into law. 
An interesting multi-dimensional balance was discovered. Not only is the Copyright 
Act meant to be brought up to speed from a legislative standpoint, but this must be so done 
bearing the constitutional implications of its development on the other equally important 
existing constitutional rights of the public, public interest, as well as being mindful of South 
Africa’s wounded historical background. How, for example, do the Copyright Regulations, 
through the limiting measures placed towards teachers, affect a child’s right to basic 
education?  Furthermore, since it is often the poorly funded schools that are not able to 
purchase copies for students and learners, what would be the long-term impact of these 
regulations, in relation to South Africa’s past of segregation? 
 The lessons which can be learnt from the United States of America is that fair use 
seems to work better than the South African fair dealing approach. That is so because s12 of 
the South African Copyright Act requires that the use of an original piece of work must be 
brought into the specified purposes of the use it sets out. This limits how the work can be 
used in the public interest and restricts the right to freedom of expression. For a person to be 
deemed to have used the work fairly the use would have to be held to the stringent 
requirements of s12 of the Copyright Act.308  The US Copyright Act is more flexible and 
requires the courts to consider all four of the above factors on a case by case basis. The 
approach of giving courts a wider discretion is that fairness can be decided more widely on 
the basis of the public interest of freedom of expression, and a court would not have to focus 
on whether the use falls within the stringent parameters of s12 of the South African 
Copyright Act.309      
 The Copyright Regulations also appear to be more stringent than necessary to protect 
copyrights. Copyright legislation should introduce a broad definition of educational 
institutions including archives and libraries which are permitted to reproduce works for 
educational purposes.310  The exception for the benefit of teachers and teaching purposes 
needs to be extended to give teachers the ability to impart information without stringent 
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regulations. It is further recommended that the Copyright Act must be amended to provide a 
broader definition of teaching in s12 (4) that includes current modes of delivery and would be 
flexible enough to cover future innovation.311        
The Copyright Amendment Bill should avoid any doubt with regards to the fair use 
provision.312 As previously stated, it needs to be clear about the type of exceptions regime it 
aims to create. It is possible to have a system of fair use, together with a list of exceptions 
which are provided to constitute, prima facie, fair use of copyright works. This would create 
an open-ended system of exceptions to copyright infringement.313 As it stands the language of 
the Bill is ambiguous, unclear and confusing. It is not possible to attach an intelligible 
meaning to it.314 The lesson which can be learnt from the USA copyright system is that an 
open-ended type of fair-use exception which the Bill purports to introduce should be 
preferred. However, the Bill must be clear about the type of exceptions regime it aims to 
create.315   
It is also important to expand copyright exceptions and limitations to better enable access 
to knowledge by providing for an exception for derivative or transformative works such as 
parody and caricature. The Copyright Amendment Bill’s proposed introduction of exceptions 
and limitations for the benefit of people with disabilities must be welcomed. The Copyright 
Amendment Bill must introduce provisions to deal with orphan works when copyright 
owners cannot be identified. The amendment must be sought in this respect in order to permit 
the use of orphan works on reasonable terms to promote access to these works.316   
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
The question which had to be answered is whether the apparent failure of South African 
copyright law to adequately safeguard the rights of owners of those copyrights means that the 
current copyright legislative framework falls short of the objective of securing an author’s 
property rights, and thus requires copyright law to be developed. This dissertation further set 
                                                          
311 Ibid. 
312 S Karjiker op cit note 143 at 18. 
313 Ibid.  
314 C Jooste ‘Commentary on The Copyright Amendment Bill’ (2015) South African Intellectual Property Law 
Journal 31. 
315 Ibid.  
316 Ibid. 
62 
 
out to balance copyright protection with the right to freedom of expression. In this regard it is 
of importance to consider the South African copyright legislative approach and the United 
States of America’s copyright legislative framework. Based on the study of both of these 
copyright legislative frameworks it is argued in this dissertation that copyright protection 
needs to be developed through the implementation of achievable recommendations by 
introducing copyright registration, limiting the period of copyright protection in certain 
instances and by improving the current landscape of copyright exceptions and limitations.  
